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COMMENTS
TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS AND SUICIDE IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION CASES
INTRODUCTION

"Nebulous" and "controversial" are two of the most oft-quoted terms
used by physicians and lawyers when describing traumatic neurosis. Actually the phrase traumatic neurosis is confusing for it connotes to the
reader that the trauma (injury) is the cause for the neurosis (mental disorder dependent on unconscious mental causes) when usually it is only
a precipitating or aggravating factor. The problems confronting the
physician, lawyer or court when dealing with a traumatic neurosis case
are complex. These problems can be summarized as follows: (1) to what
extent is the individual's pre-existing neurosis or neurotic potential responsible for his present condition; (2) to what extent is the trauma responsible for the post-traumatic neurosis; (3) should the desire for financial compensation which prolongs the neurosis be compensable; (4)
if the neurosis is kept active by brooding, marital difficulties and improper
medical handling, is it still possible to consider the neurosis as one arising
out of the injury; and (5) since symptoms are mainly subjective, how can
one determine malingering,' especially in cases (which is most often the
case 2 ) where the trauma is mild and the resulting neurosis severe so as
to lead the courts and Commissions to view the claim with ridicule, disbelief or outrage and thereby conclude that the claimant is not entitled to
compensation.
The purpose of this study is to properly delineate, in the light of today's
workmen's compensation acts, neurosis following trauma and its proper
compensability in the following two situations: (1) where the claimant
cannot return to work and (2) when he commits suicide; and further to
make specific suggestions as to how workmen's compensation acts should
be improved through legislative action.
1 DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (1952). Davidson suggests some of the following
criteria to differentiate between a malingerer and a post-traumatic neurotic: (1) a malingerer claims inability to work but retains his capacity for play; (2) faithfulness in
following doctor's orders indicate a neurotic; (3) eagerness for re-examination is more
suggestive of the neurotic; and (4) if the content of much of claimant's thinking revolves about the accident, he is most likely not a malingerer.
2 ALVAREZ, THE NEUROSIS (1951).
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A. Neurosis
Neurosis is a form of maladjustment in which a patient, despite the
fact that he is orientated to the external world,4 uses complaints or symptoms of a physical nature to express psychological needs which arise
from conflicts that are hidden from the conscious aspect of the mind.
While symptoms of the neurosis are for the most part subjective, there
may be objective physical manifestations as well.
A neurotic sympton is for the ego5 a new painful experience. The
ego's reaction to new painful experiences depends on its strength and
development. A very weak ego may be passively overwhelmed, the unexpected painful experiences producing a traumatic effect. In contrast,
a mature ego reacting in accordance with the principles of reality is able
to acknowledge the existence of painful experiences. By means of such
recognition, it can thereafter avoid or respond adequately to these experiences, rendering unavoidable pain harmless or even as useful as
possible.
A certain amount of neurotic conflict and pathogenic defense can be
sustained by everyone without an actual neurotic breakdown. Every
person has a certain amount of warded off instinctual energies which are
kept from being discharged by defensive forces and which try to break
through, nevertheless. As long as a certain stability prevails between the
repressed impulses striving for discharge and the defensive forces preventing this discharge, the person may suffer from a certain impoverishment
of his personality but otherwise remain well. Experiences that precipitate
neurosis always represent alterations in the earlier relative equilibrium
between warded-off impulses and warding off forces. Therefore, it is to
be observed that the more energy a person spends in latent defensive
conflicts, the greater is his disposition to fall ill when a precipitating
stimulus disturbs his mental equilibrium. Of course the severity of the
3 The material used in the Medical section has been taken from the following books:
NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (1953); WECHSLER, A TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL
NEUROLOGY (1952); ALVAREZ, THE NEUROSIS (1951); HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, A TEXT
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (1950); FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS

(1945).
4The psychotic on the other hand has utterly failed to adjust to society and has
broken completely with the world around him.
5 Perception, control of purposeful activity of testing reality, judgment, etc., constitute a group of functions which are collectively referred to as the ego. The ego may
be conceived of as the surface of psychic apparatus. It mediates, as it were, between the
individual and the outside world.
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stimulus and the reaction to it may vary greatly. 6 There are stimVti of such
severe intensity that they may cause a neurosis even in a person with little
predisposition; other stimuli are harmless for most persons but traumatic
for certain types who have a readiness to be overwhelmed. Disposition
(intensity of latent defensive struggles) and precipitating factors form a
complementary series.

B. Disposition
From the foregoing, it appears reasonable that everyone has the capacity for mental breakdown or illness depending on the intensity of the
stimulus and the individual's disposition. Psychoanalysis has demonstrated
that every mental process is the result of other mental processes which
have preceded it. What appears as spontaneous, irrelevant, accidental or
contradictory is directly or indirectly the result of psychic processes
which have gone before. This is known as the law of psychic determinism.
Once this fundamental concept is accepted, no mental process or behavior
reaction can appear silly, queer or ultimately unexplicable.
1. Hereditary factors.-It has been shown 7 that 21.4 per cent of the
parents of patients with anxiety states have a similar disorder while 17.5
per cent have either an anxious type of personality, i.e., timid, apprehensive, mild phobias and given to excessive worry or a depressive personality. Nineteen per cent of the parents of hysterical patients have themselves had hysterical reactions, while fourteen per cent of them exhibited
an anxious personality. It is to be assumed that certain hereditary and
constitutional factors play an etiological role, but that it is essentially their
interplay with environmental and developmental conditions which is responsible for the production of the neurosis. This neurotic potential
therefore can be traced directly to one's childhood.
2. Childhood.-Psychoanalysis considers both (1) persistence of infantile mental trends (for example: shyness, fear of being alone, inferiority
feelings, extreme sensitivity, great attachment to family, extreme suggestibility) and (2) abnormal psychosexual development (for example: disgust
for the sexual act, inability to fall in love, and preoccupation with bodily
functions) of prime etiological importance. These factors are altogether
unconscious and mirror a fantasy life which is in conflict with reality.
As the individual gets older numerous battles are fought in the subconscious. 8 Conflicts9 arise in the subconscious such as the social demands of
6 It is to be noted that it is not the severity of the stimuli per se but rather the emotional and symbolic meaning of the injury.
7 HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE,

A

TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

(1950).

8 The subconscious is an accumulation of experiences that sometimes is in use outside
the field of conscious awareness. Mental material is not all conscious or wholly uncon-
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family life, the necessity for adjustment to love life, procreation of children and the numerous exigencies of the social and economic order. To
prevent 0 the unconscious ideas from reaching consciousness and to compel them to live an independent fantasy life is the primary function of the
ego. Whenever adjustment to reality on the adult plane becomes difficult,
the individual may indulge in regression, the return within the unconscious to early or infantile points of emotional fixation. During the regression period there is an unconscious gratification of impulses which cannot possibly be admitted to consciousness because of the pain they would
inflict. In nearly every neurosis, the following are present: (1) failure of
adjustment to adult love life; (2) inability to settle the conflict in reality
at which time the individual regresses; (3) exclusion of painful experiences from the conscious (repression). It is to be remembered that the
neurosis is precipitated by an external factor (physical or otherwise) in
adult life, inducing withdrawal from reality into the world of fantasy
and this point of development of the neurosis can be traced to hereditary
factors and early childhood experiences.

C. Traumatic Neuroses
The term "traumatic neurosis" is reserved for a neurosis which is manifested after an injury. Two factors must constantly be remembered: first,
injury is not always followed by a neurosis and there need be no injury
to cause a neurosis. Second, there is no relationship between the severity
of the stimulus and the resulting neurosis. Traumatic neuroses may be
classified as follows:
1. Anxiety neurosis.-In these cases, the immediate response of the person may be extreme anxiety, fear or wild panic or there may be apparent
calm with development of previously latent symptoms after a very short
period. Palpitation, trembling, diarrhea, sweating, and other physiological
disturbances are frequently associated with these fears. The injured party
may develop insomnia with dreams representing the accident in more or
less distorted form. During the day, there is a lack of concentration or
uneasiness of mind. Although some of these functional disturbances are
objectively determinable, there is no discoverable organic cause underlying their presence.
scious. Adjustments that are worked out at an unconscious level operate on a painpleasure formula (to avoid pain, seek pleasure) and it is on this basis of overdeveloped
needs of this type that the neurosis exists. Frustration in the process of adjustment brings
pain to the patient or deprives him of pleasure.
9 These are conflicts because they are not in harmony with conscious tendencies or
principles of reality.
10 This is known as repression.

COMMENTS

2. Conversion reaction or hysteria.-This term signifies that though
there is no observable pathological cause for the pain, diminution of sensation, paralysis, etc., there is a definite functional disturbance. Repression
plays an important part in conversion. The repressed drives, urges, and
wants are released in the form of an alteration of a physical or physiological function which creates physical disability. The individual usually
displays a lack of concern about his injury, and there is present calm
acceptance of his physical disability. In cases in which the physical disturbances are predominant, it should be noted that there are often discrepancies between the findings on examination and symptoms. That is,
there is a variance from the type of injury which is caused organically.
For example, in paralysis, the reflex changes are usually at variance with
the paralysis, and the muscles do not show the atrophic changes. Likewise,
the paralysis may be selective, one voluntary action being present while
another is not.
3. Obsessive reaction.-The obsessive reactions are those in which the
individual continuously has thoughts which he is unable to control or put
aside. It is often found in traumatic neurosis cases where the injured party
cannot put the thought of the injury out of his mind; all other factors are
diminished in importance. It is rarely amenable to reason or logic; the
recognition of the absurdity of the obsession avails the patient nothing.
The person's thoughts are usually that the injury is permanent or much
more severe than it really is." a
4. Neurasthenia.-The neurastheniac shows both physical and mental
exhaustion. His mood is depressed and he is irritable, cannot concentrate,
and complains a good deal of physical ailments which cannot be verified
by examination. He is constantly preoccupied with his sexual organs and
their functions. It is often difficult for the neurastheniac to return to work
since his excessive muscular weakness and tendency to fatigue after slight
exertion hamper normal activity and make volitional effort painful.
Complicating the entire picture of traumatic neurosis is secondary gain.
That is, the injury is self-serving and fills a definite need on the part of
the patient. When a neurosis is being established, it is very uncomfortable.
But the ego tries to make a virtue of necessity and often uses the neurosis
for its own purposes. It may try to gain advantages from the outside
world by provoking pity, attention, and love. Attention is needed either
as a sexual satisfaction (a substitute for love) or, more frequently, as a
reassurance and a promise of help and protection. Sickness is often perceived as a right to privileges; these privileges may consist of material
gains and of more subtle mental gains. Very often this is no either-or; the
11 Usually with the obsession there is a compulsion reaction (repeated impulses to

carry out certain acts). But compulsive reactions are of little value in a discussion
of legal implications.

Lo
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most intense struggles for compensation are fought by patients who are
much less in need of money than in need of a sign of parental affection
and of assurance against abandonment. The longing for the time of childhood when one was being cared for is revived. Often this regression
eliminates the feeling of responsibility.
EFFECTS OF TRAUMA ON THE SUBSEQUENT NEUROSIS

The actual injury, of course, is the basis for granting compensation,
yet the trauma is seldom if ever, the sole cause of the resulting neurotic
condition. In varying degrees however, the trauma may have its effect.
The role that the trauma plays should be considered by the courts in
awarding compensation and only the results of the actual injury should
be compensable. The following five points demonstrate the varying effects
12
that the trauma may have:
1. The trauma was the cause of the psychoneurosis. This can usually be said

2.
3.
4.
5.

when there are no signs (manifest or latent) of neurotic or mental disturbances prior to the injury. Also, it must be inferred that the neurosis would
not have occurred now or later without injury. It is not often possible for
the injury case to meet both these criteria.
The injury was a major precipitatingfactor. In this case it is inferred that
a neurotic problem was latent, but that the injury brought it into full bloom
at this particular time.
The trauma was an aggravatingfactor. In such case an emotional disorder
was clinically manifest prior to the accident, but the course of the condition
was materially affected by the injury.
The injury was a minor factor. In this instance the trauma played only a
minor contributing role to the well established psychoneurotic illness.
The trauma was and is unrelated to the psychoneurosis. In this case a period
following the injury of, say, two or three months, exists before the development of the neurotic symptoms. One can then usually infer that the illness
was not of real etiological significance, although this is not a hard and fast
rule.
ILLINOIS CASES

There are a few Illinois cases which have granted compensation for
traumatic neurosis. The first case on point is United States Fuel Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n'3 in which claimant suffered a back injury and thereafter walked in a stooped position. The physicians testified that they
found no pathological explanation of claimant's disability, and the Court
held:
Where an employee has an honest, fixed, definite and continuing belief that
he is suffering severe bodily pain, and that he is in such a disordered condition
12

ERBAUCl1 AND BENJAMIN.

(Edited by Brahdy and Kahn.)

DISORDER (1937).

13 313 111. 590, 145 N.E. 122 (1924).

TRAUMA AND MENTAL
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that he is unable to work.., he is as much entitled to compensation as14if he
were in fact totally and permanently disabled by such accidental injury.
On the basis of the United States Fuel case awards were subsequently
made in HarrisburgCoal Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n' 5 and Armour
Grain Co. v. Industrial Comm'n.16 In both cases the Court held that it
was immaterial if the resulting condition was caused by a physical injury
or a mental disorder.
In all three of the above cases the injury was serious and the causal
connection between the injury and the subsequent condition quite clear.
In Sanitary Dist. v. Industrial Comm'n,'17 however, claimant suffered from
a highly nervous condition which he attempted to attribute to a slight
trauma which had occured one year previously. Evidence was introduced
which tended to show that claimant was in a bad mental condition prior
to the accident. Because of this mental condition and the fact that the
injury was slight, a causal connection between the accident and the subsequent condition could not be established and recovery was denied.
Ford Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n i8 seems to be the first case in
which the term "traumatic neurosis" was actually used by the Illinois
Supreme Court. Claimant suffered a cerebral concussion, and his subsequent condition was characterized as a traumatic neurosis. The Court
found a causal connection between the accident and the subsequent incapacity, and compensation was granted.
Regarding the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act,' 9 several sections
are pertinent to this discussion. A lump sum settlement is specifically
provided for in section 138.9 and is most advisable in traumatic neurosis
cases.2 0 Under the Illinois Act lump sum settlements are granted upon
petition if the Commission is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the
parties. Lump sum settlements, however, are rare in Illinois compared to
weekly benefits which may be reopened under section 138.18 (h). The reopening may take place at any time within thirty months at the request
of the employer or the employee on the ground that the employee's disability has increased, recurred, diminished or ended. Subsequent discus14 Id. at 593, 145 N.E. at 123.

16 323 I11.80, 153 N.E. 699 (1926).

15 315 11. 377, 146 N.E. 543 (1925).

17 343 111. 236, 175 N.E. 372 (1931).

18 355 I11.490, 189 N.E. 498 (1934). Other Illinois cases involving traumatic neurosis
are Edgell & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 111.488, 187 N.E. 413 (1933); Postal Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 345 111.349, 178 N.E. 187 (1931); Marshall Field & Co.
v. Industrial Cornin'n, 305 111.134, 137 N.E. 121 (1922).
19 111.
Rev. Star. ch. 48, § 138 (1961).
20 WECHSLER, A TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY (1952); ALVAREZ, THE NEUROSIS
(1951); FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS (1945).
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sion will attempt to show how these sections can be used or amended in
traumatic neurosis cases.
The Illinois Act does not provide for apportionment when a pre-existing disability or propensity exists. Illinois case law, however, has consistently awarded full compensation in cases where a pre-existing disease
21
is aggravated or accelerated by an accidental injury.
POSSIBILITY OF OTHER FACTORS AS CAUSE FOR NEUROSIS

Since the vast majority of workmen's compensation acts merely require
the trauma to be a precipitating or aggravating factor, it is of extreme
importance in the preparation of the case for both plaintiff and defense
attorneys to ascertain whether any other factors could have brought
about the neurosis. This is especially true for the defense attorney who
may uncover information which would completely exonerate the defendant from any pecuniary loss.
In Barr v. Builders, Inc.22 the plaintiff, prior to his accident, was served
with notice that his mortgage was being foreclosed and that he would be
forced to move. Late in July he suffered an industrial injury, and, the
following month, he was evicted from his home. In answer to the question
of whether or not a doctor would be inclined to disregard the claimant's
poor financial condition as a precipitating factor for his neurosis, the
doctor answered, "We see a lot of poor people and they are not in this
bad a shape."'23 The doctor conceeded that finances were a contributing
factor, but still maintained that the injury set off the neurosis. It is believed that, in this case, the claimant was not entitled to the full compensation awarded him. The extent to which the foreclosure was a contributing cause should have been brought out more vividly and the
plaintiff's award should have been lowered accordingly. Furthermore, it
is not inconceivable that the defense attorney could have found competent psychiatrists who would testify that the financial setback could
possibly have been the factor which brought on the neurosis.
The vital causal connection between the trauma and the subsequent
24
neurosis was recognized in Thompson v. Railway Express Agency
where the court stated:
A psychoneurosis under some circumstances does present compensable injury
but this should not open the way for indiscriminate compensation on that
score simply because it follows an accident. The causal connection with the
21 Railway Express Agency v. Industrial Comm'n, 415 Ill.
294, 114 N.E. 2d 353 (1953);
Town of Cicero v. Industrial Comm'n, 404 Ill.
487, 89 N.E.2d 354 (1949); Ohlson v.
Industrial Cornm'n, 357 111.335, 192 N.E. 196 (1934).
22 179 Kan. 617, 296 P.2d 1106 (1956).
23

ld. at 624, 296 P.2d at 1112.

24 241 Mo. App. 683, 236 S.Wv.2d 36 (1951).
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accident must be proven
by clear evidence, for such a neurosis may arise from
25
any number of causes.
The force of this quotation can be shown in the decision of Patane v.

Stix, Baer and Fuller.2 6 In this case plaintiff was employed as a salesgirl
in defendant's department store. She had a long period of inefficient
selling and had often been threatened with discharge. The evidence indicated that she had a psychoneurotic personality long before the accident,
an extremely trivial stimulus. Her poor work record continued, and she
was discharged one year subsequent to the injury. By successfully showing that the claim for neurosis was filed after the discharge and that the
discharge could have acted as a precipitating cause, the defendant was
27
able to avoid liability.
The value of expert testimony by psychiatrists in this area of the problem cannot be overlooked. Example: early in 1945, claimant suffered a
fracture of the vertebrae of the spine. No psychiatric examination was
made at this time. All treatments ended on April 30 and he was discharged as "cured." On May 1, while celebrating VE day, he was arrested
by the police. A great deal of force was used to subdue him, and claimant
suffered severe physical injuries in and about his face. While receiving
treatment at the hospital he underwent a psychiatric examination in
which his mental breakdown was diagnosed as a manic depressive
psychosis. Quaere: was this condition precipitated by the industrial injury
or the police beating? To prove the causal relationship, an expert testified
(apparently in a hypothetical) that nightmares about the accident, and
avoiding death contributed to the preclaimant's worry about narrowly
28
cipitation of the breakdown.
This case is illustrative of the fact that many times when liability has
been granted under circumstances where the decision might have been
adverse to the claimant, the testimony of expert psychiatrists has been
enough for judgment to be rendered favorably for the plaintiff. In a
recent decision, 29 the situation was that the plaintiff's arm was crushed
25

Id. at 688, 236 S.W.2d at 39. Also see the dissent in Peterson v. Department of

Labor & Industries where Tolman J. stated that "the mere fact that one suffered physical injuries in 1926 does not establish that a mental condition developing six years later
was caused by those physical injuries." 178 Wash. 15, 23, 33 P.2d 650, 653 (1934).
26 326 S.W.2d 402 (St. L. App. Ct. Mo. 1959).
27 Note the striking similarity in facts in Marshall Field & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
305 Ill. 134, 137 N.E. 121 (1922), where the claimant recovered. Also see Hood v. Texas
Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948), where a post-traumatic suggestion
by a doctor was alluded to as a precipitating cause.
28 Griffiths v. Shaffrey, 283 App. Div. 839, 129 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1954). Also see Bynum
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 102 So.2d 547 (La. App. 1958).
29 Edmonds v. Kalfaian & Son, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1959).
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and was subsequently amputated. Seven to eight years later, abnormal
behavior was first noted; shortly thereafter he was committed to a state
mental institution. Competent psychiatric testimony was to the effect
that the injury could have been the major cause of the present illness, and
the reviewing court held that it could not be said as matter of law that
plaintiff's claim was without foundation. It is to be noted that these cases
in which there is a great time lag between the injury and the onset of
manifested aspects of the neurosis are rare.30 It is urged that courts should
as a matter of law deny such claims since the possibility of intervening
factors is so great.
Most reviewing courts will not reverse prior decisions of the Commission where there was competent evidence to show that the trauma was
the precipitating factor. 3 ' It is essential, therefore, that the plaintiff present his case in such a way that the Commission thoroughly understand
the problem before it. It is imperative that the psychiatrist testifying for
the plaintiff present a complete "education" procedure. He should first
point out that there is no relationship between the severity of the trauma
32
that the patient sustained and the severity of the subsequent neurosis.
Secondly, it should be explained that while in medical terminology the
trauma is not the cause, it was the legal "trigger" of the neurosis which
brought forth the latent neurotic potential. This should do much to
overcome the ridicule and disbelief aimed at the claimant who suffers
from a severe neurosis following a mild impact. This problem was alluded
to in the Introduction. Thirdly, each neurotic symptom should be carefully explained, using appropriate analogies whenever possible;3 3 it is
impossible for the Commission to grant an adequate award if they cannot
understand the medical terminology used. 34 Finally, the psychiatrist must
show that the neurosis is directly connected with the injury 35 and not
collaterally due to desire for compensation, brooding over what could
have happened or will happen, or any other secondary gain factors.
It is essential to go into these factors and thereby present an adequate
30 See for example: Rajkovich v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 292 Mich. 162, 290 N.W. 365
(1940); Cazan v. Detroit, 279 Mich. 86, 271 N.W. 561 (1937); Harris v. Castile Mining
Co., 222 Mich. 709, 193 N.W. 855 (1923).
31 Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958); Davidson v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Ariz. 314, 235 P.2d 1007 (1951).
32 FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS (1945).
33 "[Alfter his spine healed his brain did not recognize that his spine was healed...
U.S. Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 313 I11.590, 592, 145 N.E. 122, 123 (1924).
34 See 28 F.R.D. 152 (1962) where Judge Wright points out the problem of experts
confusing both the jury and himself.
3 National Lumber & Creosoting Co. v. Kelly, 101 Colo. 535, 75 P.2d 144 (1937).
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picture of the neurosis to the Commission which will be sustained on a
possible review. Failure to do so may lead the Commission to conclude
that (1) claimant is a malingerer 6 or (2) no award can be given since no
causal relationship between the injury and subsequent neurosis was
7

proven.a

COMPENSATION NEUROSIS

It should be noted that in the vast majority of cases which are classified
by the courts as traumatic neurosis there is some element of financial
gain or compensation. In most cases the injured party unconsciouslys
does not want to get better since this might lessen his chances of securing
a large money judgment. His ego is wounded and the employee retaliates
against his employer. Too often the patient is badly handled psychologically by the insurance adjuster or his attorney. The patient may become
financially harassed and more vindictive. This is known as compensation
neurosis. This compensation factor infrequently exists alone, i.e., without
secondary gain, etc., but in many cases is the primary factor in the continuation of the neurosis. Once a cash settlement is made, pain and disability often, but not always, subside rapidly.8 9 It should be constantly
borne in mind that in practically all reported cases there was nothing
physically wrong with the patient which would prevent him from returning to work.
In a recent study of the compensation factor in cases involving low
back injuries, the patients were divided into two groups: (1) claimants
and (2) non-claimants. It was found that 88.5 per cent of those not involved in any type of litigation were considered improved (able to resume
normal activities, including work) while there were only 55.8 per cent
improvements among those who were to receive compensation for their
injuries. 40 This report stated that, as a group, the patients suffering acute
back sprain who receive compensation present different psychological
problems from those who do not receive compensation yet whose injuries
41
may be the same.
36 Hicks v. Royal Indem. Co., 80 So.2d 553 (La. App. 1955); Burton v. Norwich
Union Indem. Ins. Co., 146 So. 897 (La. App. 1933).
37 Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1956); Kalendowich v. Detecto
Scales, 9 App. Div.2d 979, 198 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1959); Baker's Case, 143 Me. 103, 55 A.2d
780 (1947).
38 See Traumatic Neuroses: Medicolegal Puzzle: a symposium, where it was stated
that only about one per cent are malingerers. 1 J. For. Sci. 65 (Jan. 1956).

39 Supra note 2,40 KRUSEN

292 (1959).
41

Ibid.

and FoRi,

COMPENSATION FACTOR IN

Low

BACK INJURIES,

26 Ins. Counsel J.
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The two leading cases denying damages for compensation neurosis are
43
Swift & Co. v. Ware4 2 and Kowalski v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.Co.
In the Swift case the claimant was suffering from a psychoneurosis manifesting itself in the form of a right side hemoplegia (paralysis). The
Court held that where the injured's nervous state consisted of the belief
that he had sustained an injury, this was compensable. If, on the other
hand, the neurotic state was occasioned by a desire to continue drawing
compensation, this condition was not compensable because it did not
grow out of an accident but out of the want, need and desire for food,
clothing and support of his family. Similarly, in the Kowalski case, the
Court concluded that claimant's nervous symptoms were due to uncertainty created by the continuing prospect of the plaintiff's reopening
his case and receiving further compensation. His claim was denied on the
finding that his symptoms could not have been caused by the original
injury.
The reasoning of these two Courts was applied in Hicks v. Royal
Indem. Co. 44 where the court stated that "evidence must be carefully
scrutinized because of the fact that compensation neurosis is so closely
akin to post traumatic neurosis that the very faint line between them is
so indistinct that it is extremely difficult to determine on which side of
'45
the line each particular case should be placed.
It is submitted that the above cases represent the correct view of this
problem of compensation neurosis. The inarticulated order of reasoning
in the above cases is as follows:
1. The percentage of disability further caused by an aggravation of an industrial injury is compensable if the aggravating factors bear a causal relationship to the original injury.
2. But desire for compensation does not have a causal relationship to the
injury.
3. Therefore the percentage of disability caused by a compensation neurosis
is not compensable.
This argument, however, has not been accepted by the majority of
courts. Many courts are inclined to hold that human beings cannot separate themselves from a myriad of emotions, and so long as one of the
causes is industrial, it matters not that non-industrial causes play a part.
One Court stated that to deny recovery was "like saying that [claimant]
should not recover for the loss of a leg because the cut he received would
46
not have resulted in such loss had gangrene not set in."
The answer to this type of argument is that the disability (compensa4253

Ga. App. 553, 186 S.E. 452 (1936).

44

80So.2d 553 (La. App. 1955).

116 Conn. 241, 164 At. 653 (1933).
4 5d.
at 558.
40 Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co., 62 Idaho 192, 204, 190 P.2d 622, 627 (1941).

43
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tion neurosis) is not traceable to or induced by a personal injury but to
circumstances immediately following, i.e., possible litigation. Furthermore,
these symptoms do not appear within a reasonable time after the injury
but rather a reasonable time after the injured party becomes aware of the
fact that he is entitled to compensation and that the amount of compensation to be received depends on his inability to work. It is to be remembered that the further the factors responsible for the neurosis are
removed in time and direct consequence from the injury, the more such
factors take on their true nature as independent, intervening causes.
Proper reflection will show that there is a distinction between such a
situation and a neurotic condition having a causal relationship with the
47
injury.
The leading case which granted compensation for compensation neurosis is Hood v. Texas Indem. Co. 48 Peititioner alleged that he suffered

injury to his left foot and right elbow, was suffering presently from a
traumatic neurosis and was totally and permanently disabled. It was
found that the petitioner's neurosis was in fact influenced by an unconscious desire for compensation, and, after termination of the litigation,
he would begin to improve. The Court held that if the injury was a
producing cause, the employee was entitled to full compensation to the
extent of such disability, even though other factors also contributed to
the disability. The dissent maintained that a neurotic disability, the continued duration of which is solely caused by the existence of litigation,
cannot be compensable.
The striking independency of this type of neurosis from the injury can
be seen from an examination of Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ham.49
Several months passed after the accident before the neurosis appeared.
The plaintiff then began suffering from a glove and stocking anesthesia
which is loss or diminution of sensation from the elbows to the fingertips
and from the knees to the toes. (This appears to be a conversion reaction.)
Expert testimony was to the effect that the emotional stress of the litigation was a definite factor which brought about the neurosis. It is entirely
possible that, had there been an early settlement of this case (1) the
claimant would not have suffered from this neurosis, and (2) the employer could have saved a great deal of money.
In another Texas case 5° the court followed the Hood case in awarding
47National Lumber & Creosoting Co. v. Kelly, 101 Colo. 535, 75 P.2d 144 (1937);
Bramble v. Shields, 146 Md. 494, 127 At. 44 (1924).
4s 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.VV.2d 345 (1948).
49333 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
50
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hatton, 252 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952),
rev'd on other grounds, 255 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1953).
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damages where testimony showed that plaintiff's mental condition would
improve greatly within a short time after the litigation. A Louisiana
court 5' stated that it was obvious that claimant was suffering from " 'compensationitis' and is subject to an efficient cure by application of a
'greenback poultice.' "52
The importance of the compensation factor cannot be quickly overlooked and brushed aside as merely another element of damages. It is to
be observed that in the majority of cases only with quick, adequate, lump
sum settlements as opposed to a constant reopening of the case can the
claimant more easily return to a normal, productive life. 53 For example,
in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Michalski,54 all psychiatrists agreed
that before the accident plaintiff was emotionally unstable. He was extremely tense as a result of difficulties with his father when claimant was
young and with his wife in recent years. Two doctors testified that, in
their opinion, the termination of litigation would help the claimant's recovery. Another doctor stated that he could not see how the patient
could be helped with treatment unless there was a permanent and final
disposition of the case. A Dr. Truitt stated that all neurotic problems
caused by the injury had been cleared up; that the compensation question was the sole reason why plaintiff could not return to work; that in
his opinion the claimant would be able to return to work if the case was
definitely settled. The Judge sagaciously recommended that the case be
immediately and finally settled.55
And in Peterson v. Department of Labor & Industries,56 the Court in
1927 was advised that claimant's symptoms were apt to continue as long
as the state paid compensation. He was paid until 1929 when his case was
closed. Yet in 1932 claimant had his case reopened and was allowed further compensation on the grounds that his disability had not cleared up.
Though psychiatrists still maintained he had a "desire neurosis"5 7 (for
compensation), the Court dismissed this by stating that this could not be
the case since his payments were stopped in 1929. It is submitted that the
Court has clearly erred in this case because the mere fact that a lump sum
has been paid does not stop the claimant from trying subconsciously to
"get even." The plaintiff must consider the payment fair, that the em5i Miller v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 99 So.2d 511 (L[a. App. 1957).

at 519.
53 Supra note 2.
54 144 F. Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1956).
65 Lump sums have often been recommended. e.g., some recent cases: Whitfield v.

521 d.

Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 125 So.2d 165 (La. App. 1960); Martino v. California Artificial
Flower Co., 161 A.2d 193 (R.I. 1960); Gallagher v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Wis.2d 361, 101
N.,V.2d 72 (1960).
56 178 Wash. 15, 33 P.2d 650 (1934).
57 Id. at 19,33 P.2d at 652.
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ployer fully recognizes his claim and is not trying to "put something
over." Further, the fact that payments ceased in 1929 did not signify the
end of litigation since claimant could and did reopen thecase in 1932.
SECONDARY GAIN FACTORS

Though compensation neurosis is a highly complicated and important
factor, it is not to be assumed that in all cases early settlement 58 will always result in a prompt and quick recovery. In addition to the fact that
the employee must consider the settlement fair, one must not lose sight of
secondary gain factors, i.e., constant brooding over what could have happened or will happen, improper medical handling, and other collateral
difficulties. These are all highly important independent factors which
tend to prolong any neurosis following trauma and the principal reasons
why a patient does not recover after litigation has ended.
Although many psychiatrists and most medical-legal periodicals report
that lump sum settlements are best, there are a few reports which tend to
show that the value of lump sum settlements are overrated. For example,
of 321 cases investigated three years after a lump settlement, sixty-seven
involved some form of neurosis. Of the sixty-seven only one had made a
complete recovery; twenty-two had returned to work with earnings
down forty per cent; twenty-two were at work, had not improved, with
earnings down sixty per cent; of the last twenty-two, two were dead and
none of the others were at work.59 This survey of cases illustrates the fact
that while lump sum payments are in most cases advisable, each case
should be judged and decided on its own merits. There are cases where
there is neurosis following trauma which involves little if any of the compensation factor and secondary gain factors. The advisability of lump sum
settlements is dependent to a large measure on the testimony of competent medical authorities, and their advice should be carefully considered.
Brooding and marital difficulties which prolong and aggravate the neurosis have, by the majority of courts, been placed in the same category as
compensation neurosis insofar as recovery is concerned. In Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co.60 plaintiff, a laborer, suffered minor cuts and bruises,
and after treatment, physicians found no perceptible change in his physical condition. However, he complained of the increasing frequency of
headaches and dizziness; he claimed traumatic neurosis and recovered.
The plaintiff brooded over whether or not he could do heavy work in the
future, had domestic worries, and other worries of like kind. The Court
58 What is meant by early settlement has already been alluded to and will be more
fully explained in Recommended Statutory Changes.

59 Henderson & Gillespie, supra note 3.
60 62 Idaho 192, 109 P.2d 622 (1941).
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chose to ignore these factors even though the following testimony shows
that these factors were responsible.
Q. [By Attorney] But the headaches would not be present if it were not for the
accident....
A. [By Psychiatrist] That is half truth, but.., if he had not these other emotional factors he would not have the present headaches. 61
The most important case representing the opposite point of view in the
62
above mentioned situation is Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n.
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the plaintiff's neurosis did not
arise from his injury, but was in fact induced by a deep-set fear or apprehension of imaginary ailments that might follow as a result of his injury
and the deplorable condition in which his family might be left. The Court
maintained that these were circumstances following the injury, and therefore no award for such neurosis could be made. It should be pointed out
that the Court followed in essence the syllogistic type of reasoning previously mentioned in the discussion of compensation neurosis. Schneyder
v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.6 3 involved a situation in which there was no
physical impairment to the claimant preventing him from returning to
work; however, plaintiff developed a bad mental condition in which notions of injustice and persecution in connection with his claim for compensation predominated. The Court remanded the case to see if the proper rule was invoked. This rule was stated as follows: "[W]here the mental
disturbance is collateral to the injury, does not arise directly from it, but
is due to worry, anxiety, or brooding over the accident or its effect ...or
'6 4
the like, it is not compensable.
Directly opposite results can be found in Rodriguez v. New York Dock
Co.' 5 During the long litigation process claimant brooded and was melancholy over his injuries and his inability to work; the court concluded that
the trauma induced the neurosis. One New Jersey case6 6 went so far as to
hold that if the trauma was the initiating cause plaintiff could recover.
Plaintiff was not suffering from any neurosis following the injury. Even
though a psychiatrist testified that prior to and after the accident, claimant was potentially psychoneurotic and that his present neurotic condition was due to environmental, economic and family difficulties, the court
stated that the trauma set off a chain of events which resulted in a neurosis.
As was previously stated in the section on secondary gain, there are
61 Id. at 202-03, 109 P.2d at 626.
6246

Ariz. 162, 49 P.2d 391 (1935).
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280 Mich. 127, 273 N.W. 418 (1937).
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65 256 App. Div. 875,9 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1939).
66 Smith v. Essex County Park Comrn'n, 15 N.J.Mjisc. 227, 190 AtI. 45 (1937).
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those individuals who find an illness an escape from unconscious difficulties. To escape the drudgery of existence, the grinding monotony of industrial life, family conflicts and responsibility, the individual unconsciously makes use of the trauma. That he thereby gives up a living wage
for a mere pittance of compensation is no sound argument, because the
67
unconscious gain may more than outweigh the loss in terms of money.
This is the major reason why it cannot be said that lump sum settlements
per se will solve all problems in this area. Perhaps these secondary gain
factors should be called "security of disability."6 This is a sense of security based upon what the employee's disability promises for him in the
way of medical attention or financial remuneration. It makes him feel incompetent to return to work and gives him a feeling that the safer thing
for him to do is to hold on to these things. For example, in one case plaintiff was knocked down by a bolt slung from some moving machinery.
The employee was sincere in his erroneous belief that he suffered a serious, disabling injury. In addition, this neurosis was prolonged and kept
active by (1) underlying and unconscious feelings of persecution, and
(2) a desire to use the injury as an excuse to evade responsibility. As in
the majority of such cases, claimant was allowed recovery. 69
The minority position on the other hand is best evidenced in Miller

Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n70 which denied compensation for this "security of disability." As is usually found in such cases,
the stimulus was minor, the only objective finding was an abrasion on both
hips. Careful psychiatric examinations showed that prior to the injury
the claimant was emotionally immature and was unable to face the responsibility of a growing family (wife and nine children); that he used
the accident as a defense against the demands of reality; that he was ready
to allow his wife to take over the responsibilities of wage earning while
he planned to take her place in the home. The Court correctly held that
there was no causal link between the minor injury and the claimant's
present neurotic condition. It is believed that even had this been a major
injury and had all other factors remained constant, no recovery would
have been allowed.
At times, improper medical handling is often at fault in either actually
initiating the neurosis or aggravating and keeping it alive. 7' The physician
must treat each case separately and not apply similar treatment for all regardless of physical condition. Failure to do so may start difficult psycho67 WECHSLER,

A

TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY

68

(1952).

Eller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 228 Iowa 1247, 1252, 291 N.W. 866, 869 (1940).
69 Webber v. Wofford-Brindley Lumber Co., 113 So.2d 23 (La. App. 1959).
70 263

Wis. 538, 57 N.W.2d 736 (1953).
71 Supra, note 2.
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logical problems. A recent report 72 showed that in cases where people
were initially suffering from low back pain, "physical therapy" often consisted of merely a heat lamp or diathermy. If the employee needed more
intensive treatment, he frequently developed a prejudice against physical
therapy which had to be overcome. The employee became resentful toward his employer, doctor or both and lost his motivation to work. However, adequate physical therapy may provide an "out" for the patient's
psychological problems if it is started early enough.7 3 It is important that
a doctor convey an optimistic attitude about the injury when possible.
The patient should fully understand that his condition is only temporary
(as is often the case). What definitely should be avoided are statements
by the doctor such as: "If you are not dead in a few days you can come
''74 In the dissent in the Hood
back and I will see what I can do about it.
case, it was stated that a doctor's suggestive statement that claimant
would be incapacitated for at least six months (when clearly this was not
true) could have been a significant factor in initiating the disabling neurosis. Sometimes, it is advisable for the physician to perform an exploratory operation to convince the patient that there is nothing wrong with
him thereby enabling him to return to his proper role in society. 75
APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN PRE-EXISTING NEUROTIC POTENTIAL
AND POST-TRAUMATIC CONDITION

As was previously mentioned, trauma may have various effects on different people. If one were to categorize those who suffer from traumatic

neurosis, one would find the following: (a) those who already have a
well established neurotic illness and display their symptoms to others before the trauma; (b) those who have pronounced neurotic tendencies;
(c) those who have "mild" latent neurotic problems; (d) those who can
be considered average.7 6 As will be shown, it is important to ascertain into
which category a claimant is to be placed in order to determine the
proper compensation for his injury. It should be noted that those who are
in categories (b) and (c) never display the neurotic symptoms so that
laymen associates can conclude that they are acting "peculiarly" or
72 KRUSEN AND FORD, COMPENSATION FACTOR IN Low BACK INJURIES, 26

Ins. Counsel

J.

292 (1959).
73 Ibid. Peculiarly, those who receive compensation are referred for treatment later
than those who do not receive compensation.
74 Thompson v. Railway Express Agency, 241 Mo. App. 683, 686, 236 S.W.2d 36, 39
(1951).

75

Holobinko v. Moshannon Smithing Coal Co., 145 Pa. Super. 489, 21 A.2d 440 (1941).

What is meant by average is one who has a mature ego and who ordinarily will
not have a post-traumatic neurosis. According to the classification of the effect of the
trauma, he would be in category (a).
76
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"queerly" and rarely, if ever, in any of the first three categories does the
pre-existing neurotic condition or constitution disable the person to the
point that he is unable to work. Therefore, it is of minor significance to
one using a scientific approach to this problem to find the cases resplendent with laymen testifying to the fact that the plaintiff was a happy,
jovial-type individual before the accident, and that now he is moody, depressed, complains of pain constantly, and no longer can do the work he
formerly could do. 77 Needless to say, this is a favorite device of plaintiffs'
attorneys. It is not meant to deprecate such tactics, but merely to note
that such evidence is of little value in scientifically approaching the subject. On the other hand, from the defendant's standpoint, if the neurotic
symptoms were present previously, this may be evidence of the fact that
78
the injury did not precipitate the neurosis.
The major stumbling blocks to a scientific apportionment between the
pre-existing neurotic conditions or constitutions and post-traumatic conditions in workmen's compensation cases are the Workmen's Compensation Acts. The vast majority of such acts pay little attention to pre-existing conditions, both physical 79 and mental.8 0 Those acts which do have
some provisions for apportionment do so on the basis that the neurosis
affected the workman's ability to perform his work properly. (Exception: Kentucky.)
Many, if not virtually all, claimants have some predisposition to a neurotic reaction. 8' The industrial injury serves as a catalytic agent which
triggers this potential into a neurosis. Although symptoms may be precipitated by a trauma, they are not necessarily directly related to the
trauma but in varying degrees are related to claimant's neurotic history.
It seems unjust then, that full compensation should be allowed for the
subsequent psychoneurosis merely because of the "trigger mechanism"
which often consists of a relatively minor injury, which, were it not for
the neurosis would be entitled to little compensation. Although it is argued that the employer takes the employee as he is, the difficulties in determining whether an applicant for a job has a neurotic personality must
be considered. While a relatively simple physical examination will dis77 E.g., Patane v. Stix, Baer & Fuller, 326 S.W.2d 402 (St. L. App. Ct., Mo. 1959);
Bynum v. Maryland Cas. Co., 102 So.2d 547 (La.App. 1958).

7sErwin v. Railway Express Agency, 128 S.W.2d 1077 (Kansas City Ct. App., Mo.
1939).
70 Taylor

v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 65 So.2d 360 (La.App. 1953); Gallo-

way v. Ford Motor Co., 5 N.J. 396, 75 A.2d 855 (1950).
80 E.g., Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 190, 349 P.2d 627 (1960); Jacobson v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 37 Wash.2d 444, 224 P.2d 338 (1950).
81 WECHSLER, A TEXTBOOK Or CLINICAL NEUROLOGY (1952); ALVAREZ, THE NEUROSS
(1951); FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS (1945).
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cover most physical disabilities, involved psychiatric examinations are required to discover neurotic potentialities. An employer should be expected to make sure that any employee who will be engaged in heavy
work is physically fit for such work, but an employer should not be expected to ascertain beforehand if an employee will develop a neurotic
reaction after a relatively minor injury. A few courts have recognized
this and have apportioned awards accordingly by awarding compensation
for the existing neurosis to the extent that it was aggravated by the accidental injury.8 2 In these and other jurisdictions there is usually a provision in the workmen's compensation statute which provides that where
there is a pre-existing injury or disease, compensation shall be allowed
83
only for such proportion of the disability due to the present injury.
In Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n s4 claimant suffered from a life-long personality difficulty but nevertheless was gainfully
employed. He received a compensable injury which aggravated the preexisting disorder and a psychiatric break resulted. Claimant was found
to have a seventy-nine per cent total permanent disability rating and
forty-nine per cent was attributed to the industrial injury. The Court, on
the basis of a prior case, 85 held however, that the pre-existing disorder
must be an actual labor disability, and that the statute was not meant to
apply to asymptomatic diseases. A mere neurotic predisposition according to the view of this Court, would probably not justify apportionment.
The above seems to be the general rule in cases where pre-existing physical injuries are considered in the compensation award, and if the physical
condition was hitherto quiescent, and the accidental injury accelerated or
precipitated it to the point of disability, compensation is granted.80 An
attempt, however, has been made by those states which do apportion to
encourage the hiring of the partially disabled by assuring employers that
they would not be liable for the effects of an existing disability.
82 Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 1 Cal. Rptr. 833, 348 P.2d
193 (1960); Simon v. R.H.H1. Steel Laundry, 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (1953); Old
King Mining Co. v. Mullins, 252 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1952); Smith v. Essex County Park
Comm'n, 15 N.J. Misc. 227, 190 Atl. 45 (1937); Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont.
239, 22 P.2d 157 (1933); Sigley v. Marathon Razor Blade Co., 111 N.J. 25, 166 At. 518
(1933); Ashland Limestone Co. v. Wright, 219 Ky. 691, 294 S.W. 159 (1927); Moray v.
Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 109 Pac. 1023 (1921).
83 Code of Ala. tit. 26, § 288 (1959); Deering's Calif. Codes, Labor, § 4751 (1962);
Gen. Star. of Conn. tit. 31, § 139 (1958); Del. Code tit. 19, § 2329 (1953); Fla. Code ch.
440, § 15 (1959); Idaho Code § 72-323 (1947); Ky. Rev. Star. 5 342.005 (1960); Rev.
Star. of Neb. ch. 48, § 128 (1960); New Hamp. Rev. Star. ch. 281, § 47 (1958); N. Dak.
Cent. Code ch. 65-04, § 18 (1960).
84 1 Cal. Rptr. 833, 348 P.2d 193 (1960).
85 Ferguson v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 50 Cal.2d 469, 326 P.2d 145 (1958).
88 Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 145 A.2d 362 (1958).
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The Kentucky Supreme Court has apportioned, in cases where there
was no previous disability, on the basis of a state statute87 which provides
for apportionment where there is a pre-existing disease "whether previously disabling or not." On two occasions the results of a pre-existing
neurosis were separated from those of an industrial injury, and compensation was awarded only to the extent that the impairment was aggravated. 88 In both cases total disability resulted from a compensable injury
but only a fifty per cent award was granted.
A New Jersey court, in Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry,8 9 also apportioned on the basis of a predisposition to undue psychic or emotional
shock which in no way had previously disabled claimant from working.
Although no traumatic injury occurred, claimant was rendered totally
disabled as a result of an explosion. The Commission found sixty-five per
cent of the disability chargeable to the accident and thirty-five per cent
due to "unrelated paranoid trends." Compensation was granted to the extent of sixty-five per cent.
Although it seems just to take into account this pre-trauma personality
and apportion accordingly, by far the majority of courts which have
dealt with the problem refuse apportionment. There are cases which
speak of claimant having a "predisposition to neurosis,"' 0 "pre-existing
'
"personality disturbance," 92 or as being "by
latent mental disturbance,"91
nature of a neurotic condition,"'9 3 yet none of these courts consider this
prior condition in awarding compensation. The usual statement made by
the court is that the injury was the "exciting cause" which precipitated
94
the neurosis, and therefore full compensation should be, and is, awarded.
The extremes to which some courts go in awarding compensation when
a pre-existing condition exists is manifest in Bynum v. Maryland Cas.
Co.9 5 There claimant suffered from an anxiety psychoneurosis producing
genuinely felt pain. The neurosis resulted from a series of three consecutive accidents. Total compensation was awarded for the third injury on
the basis that it "could be the trigger which activated the neurosis."9' 6
87 Ky. Rev. Stat. S 342.005 (1960).
88 Old King Mining Co. v. Mullins, 252 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1952); Ashland Limestone
Co. v. Wright, 219 Ky. 691, 294 S.W. 159 (1927).
8925 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (1953), aff'd, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604 (1953).
90 Hayes v. Garvey Drilling Co., 188 Kan. 179, 360 P.2d 889 (1961).
91 Karwacki v. General Motors Corp., 293 Mich. 355, 292 N.W. 328 (1940).
92Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958).
93 Farran v. Curtis Publishing Co., 276 Pa. 553, 120 Atl. 544 (1923).
94 Hayes v. Garvey Drilling Co., 188 Kan. 179, 360 P.2d 889 (1961).
95

102 So.2d 547 (La. App. 1958).

96 Id. at 552.
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The existence of a prior neurotic condition makes any connection between the trauma and the subsequent condition much more difficult to

prove. In Miller Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n 97 although claimant was not disabled prior to a slight trauma, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed the Commission's award for total disability because of claimant's basic, pre-existing psychoneurotic personality. A
strong dissent, however, argued that the employer takes the employee as
he finds him, and that it was entirely immaterial that without the underlying neurosis the traumatic neurosis would not have occurred. 98
Courts which deny compensation for neurosis arising out of collateral
conditions (e.g., brooding, secondary gain, etc.) might also consider apportioning collaterally. A portion of the resulting neurosis might be
traced directly to the trauma, and such portion might be considered
compensable while the court might, at the same time, deny compensation
for the neurosis arising from collateral causes. No court, however, has
been found that so apportioned. Yet when a neurosis, which had theretofore not existed, manifests itself immediately following a trauma and
then collateral causes enter into the picture and increase the severity of
such neurosis, a Commission would be justified in awarding compensation
for the former and not for the latter, thus making a collateral apportionment.
Although courts have been liberal in awarding compensation when
proof of the connection between the trauma and the subsequent neurosis
is weak, attorneys for the defendants nevertheless would be wise to show
a prior neurosis or a neurosis arising from collateral causes when such is
the case. In Illinois, since the workmen's compensation statute does not
provide for apportionment, the reason for showing the existence of such
a neurosis would be to defeat the contention of a causal relationship between the subsequent condition and the injury.
SUICIDE

The suicide cases present an interesting problem in that they also involve a mental derangement following a trauma and therefore are similar
to cases including traumatic neurosis.9 9 Any compensation is based on the
97 263 Wis. 538, 57 N.W.2d 736 (1953).
98 The New York Appellate Court in a similar case also denied compensation although the evidence tended to show that the accident was a precipitating factor in
that there was no break with reality until the accident occurred. The court held that
substantial evidence of such a precipitating factor would have to be shown. The fact

that claimant had been suffering from a psychosis of long and insidious progress made

the causal connection difficult to prove. Jarecki v. John T. Clark & Son, 3 App. Div.2d
612, 157 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1956).

99 In three interesting cases compensation has been awarded when no trauma has
occurred. Burnight v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 181 Cal. App.2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786
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victim's mental attitude at the moment that the suicidal act is committed,
and the courts seldom critically examine causation. Three basic rules have
developed for awarding compensation where suicide follows a trauma
suffered "on the job." A discussion of these rules will follow together
with a recent Illinois case of some import before the problem of causation
is presented.
The basis for awarding compensation in the majority of jurisdictions is
that the insanity must be shown to be the result of the trauma causing the
victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy without conscious volition to produce death. 1t0 This
rule was first formulated in Sponatski's Case'0' where the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held:
Where there follows as a direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such
violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable
impulse or in a delirium of frenzy 'without conscious volition to produce
death, having knowledge of the physical nature and consequences of the act,'
then there is a direct10 2and unbroken causal connection between the physical
injury and the death.
Although the Massachusetts legislature subsequently broadened the rule
by a statute which does not require that the victim be acting without
knowledge of the nature of the act, 10 3 nevertheless the rule as originally
set down is followed by the majority of jurisdictions.
The courts which follow this majority rule draw a distinction between
the act of a man, insane as a result of an injury, who takes his own life
without knowledge of the nature of his act and, on the other hand, the
suicidal act of such a man who consciously determines to take his own
life and carries this design into execution. In the latter case these courts
say that the chain of causation between the injury and the death is broken
by the -voluntary, though insane choice of the injured person and an intervening cause comes into existence. 0 4 It is extremely difficult for a
court to draw a precise line between a wilful choice of suicide, an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, and an uncontrollable impulse to
(1960); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960); Wilder v.
Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644 (1927).
100 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 36 (1952).
101 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915). The rule was taken from a tort case, Daniels
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903).
102 Id. at 5, 108 N.E. at 468.

103 Ann. Laws of Mass. ch. 152, S 26A (1961 Supp.). Compensation is now granted
"if it be shown by the weight of evidence that, due to the injury, the employee was of
such unsoundness of mind as to make him irresponsible for his act of suicide."
104 Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.V.2d 199 (1942).
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commit suicide without knowledge of the consequences of the act, but
the courts have usually been extremely liberal in making the distinction
and have been prone lately to find the latter where the majority rule is
still adhered to.
New York has a similar, but somewhat more liberal rule than the majority. In Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co. 105 it was held:
Death benefits are allowed if the injury results naturally and unavoidably in
disease, and the disease causes death. This is so if the injury causes insanity
from gangrenous poisoning or otherwise, and the insanity directly causes suicide; in other words, if the suicide is not the result of discouragement, of
melancholy, or other sane conditions but of brain derangement. 1 6
It should be noted that brain derangement is the sine qua non.
Florida was the first state to make a radical departure from the majority rule. In Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co. 10 7 the requirement that the
decedent must commit the suicidal act under an uncontrollable impulse
and without conscious volition was done away with. The court criticized
the majority rule by saying:
There is no force to the argument, propounded by some courts, that the
act of suicide is an independent intervening cause of the death of the workman, thus breaking the chain of causation from the injury to the death of the
deceased. While it may be an independent intervening cause in some cases, it
is certainly not so in those cases where the incontrovertible evidence shows
that, without the injury, there would have been no suicide; that the suicide
was merely an act intervening between the injury and the death, and part of
an unbroken chain of events from the injury to the death, and not a cause
intervening between the injury and the death.' 08
This new rule was first adopted outside of Florida in Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n'09 where the court also recognized that while the depressed person is perfectly aware that his act will produce death, the
choice to kill himself may still not be entirely voluntary.
California too seems to have joined the minority. In Burnight v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n" the appellate court criticized the requirement that
the deceased must know the nature of his act and held that if the victim
believes the resulting pain to be such that he cannot stand it, and becomes
so depressed that he feels that suicide is the only way out, the act of suicide directly results from his injury. This rule, however, does not contemplate cases where there is little or no physical pain and in fact was
105 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431 (1928); see also McIntosh v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 12
App. Div.2d 406, 211 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1961).
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evolved in a case where the victim had suffered no trauma whatsoever
but nevertheless had a mental breakdown.
Illinois has most recently taken a stand with the minority in Harper v.
Industrial Comm'n. i1n While working in his company's warehouse, the
employee sustained a back injury which was diagnosed as a herniated
disk. An operation was performed, and approximately nine months later
he returned to work and was assigned to a lighter task. He worked four
full days and on the fifth day walked off the job, drove rapidly to his
home, which was eight miles away, got his shotgun, drove to a tavern
parking lot and shot himself. Evidence was admitted showing him to be a
friendly and sociable man with a jolly disposition prior to the accident
and that subsequent to the injury and the operation he was a less jovial
man who "read much more than before." His doctor testified that he
found no evidence of pain that would cause him to injure himself. In reversing the denial of compensation the Court criticized the rule of Sponatski's Case stating:
It seems to assume that a man's capacity to choose is a constant, unvariable
factor, unaffected by whatever stresses may be brought to bear against it, and
so it minimizes to the point of exclusion the possibility that capacity to choose
may itself be impaired as the result of a compensable injury. If any degree of
choice or volition remains, recovery is barred 'even though choice is dominated and ruled by a disordered mind'-which by hypothesis means a mind
that has been disordered as the result of the injury for which compensation is
the Sponatski test is dubious, both
sought. To us this underlying assumption of
112
from a medical and a legal point of view.
The rule in the Whitebead case was considered to be the "proper approach" and was adopted.
A clear connection between the injury, the resulting pain with its
physical and mental changes, and the suicide exists; this is pointed out by
the Court. Having found this direct connection the Court found it unnecessary to delve into the decedent's mind at the moment of suicide in order
to determine if there was an uncontrollable impulse.
This approach seems proper. It is impossible to determine what the suicide's thoughts were at the moment of death. What is important is that a
direct causal connection exists between the injury and the suicide, as it
did inthis case.
The rules which the courts apply in determining if compensation is to
be awarded deal solely with the condition of the victim's mind at the
time of death. The courts seldom, if ever, consider the circumstances
which led to the mental disorder. Compensation is awarded so long as
there is some type of accident to trace this disorder to. The courts do not
111 24 I11.2d 103,180 N.E.2d 480 (1962).
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consider either collateral causes (e.g., brooding) or pre-existing psychoneurotic or manic depressive personalities.
Suicide cases which involve a minor injury resulting in little pain are
n8
surprisingly plentiful. In Karlen v. Department of Labor & Industries,
for example, a worker sustained an injury to his thumb which healed
shortly thereafter. He suffered from what was diagnosed as manic depressive psychosis, and seven months later he committed suicide. Although two of the testifying physicians found no causal connection between the thumb injury and the victim's mental condition, nevertheless
compensation was granted and the employer was forced to pay for the
remote possibility of a suicide following a cured thumb injury.
In a similar English case 1 4 the victim also suffered a thumb injury for
which he was subsequently awarded compensation. Thereafter he developed neurasthenia and became depressed and melancholic; four months
later he committed suicide. Compensation for the suicide was denied
however, and the court held that in order for compensation to be granted
it is necessary to prove that the suicide was caused by insanity and that
the insanity was the direct result of the accident, not an indirect result
caused by brooding over the accident. Although the deceased's mental
condition at the time of the suicide may have been such as to qualify his
dependants for compensation, it was denied because that mental condition was brought about by brooding over the accident. This seems to be
an excellent approach. The court has not forced an employer to pay for
the result of the deceased employee's own mental condition brought
about by factors not under the employer's control, especially when such
mental attitude is aggravated by collateral factors unrelated to the accident. American courts have failed to make such a distinction and compensation is awarded in many cases where brooding is the real cause of
the insanity.
As in cases of traumatic neurosis, when a suicide is involved the courts
do not consider the victim's mental condition prior to the accident. Such
condition, if it exists, nonetheless should be brought out in order to determine the real cause of the insanity which culminated in the suicide.
Several cases have noted a pre-existing neurosis or psychosis but still have
found a causal connection between the injury and the suicide. Of these
the following two are of particular significance since they are also cases
where no trauma occurred.
In Wilder v. Russell Library Co.1 5 the workman, who had a predisposition to mental trouble, worked excessively and became nervous. An in],
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sanity developed which resulted in suicide. The Court reasoned that had
it not been for the employment, the suicide would not have occurred and
compensation was awarded. In Burnight v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n" 6 a
similar result was reached. Prior to employment the victim had been diagnosed as a manic depressive psychotic with schizophrenic and paranoiac
tendencies. He was sent by his employer to Mexico to supervise the construction of a plant, suffered a series of frustrations and thereafter committed suicide. The court did not go into the deceased's prior mental condition in determining whether the employment conditions were a direct
cause or a contributing cause. Recent cases, however, grant compensation even if the trauma or employment conditions are shown to be only a
contributing cause. 117 In one case the California appellate court reversed
a denial of compensation with instructions which adopted the more liberal minority rule as to the workman's mental attitude at the moment of
the suicidal act.
Many cases exist where a pre-existing physical injury is either aggravated or accelerated and a suicide results. Here too compensation is uniformly granted even though the present injury would have been considered slight in itself." 8
In conclusion, it should be noted that the growing minority view recentiy adopted by Illinois allows compensation for a suicide even if the
deceased workman took his life wilfully. But the requirement still applies
that a causal connection must exist between the injury and the suicide.
Proof of a prior mental condition or the existence of collateral mental circumstances may break this connection.
RECOMMENDED STATUTORY CHANGES

One recommendation is that any workmen's compensation statute provides either for apportionment or waiver by the employee of his rights to
compensation for certain injuries. Regarding apportionment the Kentucky statute" 9 should be considered. It provides that compensation shall
not be granted for the results of a pre-existing disease whether previously
disabling or not. Paragraph 2 of the same section provides:
116 181 Cal. App.2d 816, 5 Cal Rptr. 786 (1960).
117 Olson v. F. I. Crane Lumber Co., 259 Minn. 248, 107 N.W.2d 223 (1960);
Blasczak v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193 Pa. Super. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960); Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875, 88 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1949).
118 See Olsen v. F.I. Crane Lumber Co., 259 Minn. 248, 107 N.W.2d 223 (1960),
victim suffered coronary on job but had a pre-existing heart condition; Prentiss Truck &
Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So.2d 272 (1956), victim had a dormant ruptured disk; Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875, 88 N.Y.S.2d 885
(1949), victim suffered from 40 per cent loss of use of one eye, present injury resulted
in total loss of vision in that eye. In all cases suicide followed.
119 Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 342 S 342.005 (1960).
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The board shall apportion the aggregate extent and duration of disability
among the contributing causes including but not limited to the following:
(a) 'Traumatic injury by accident';
(b) Pre-existing disease previously disabling;
(c) Pre-existing disease not previously disabling but aroused into disabling results by the injury or occupational disease.
The waiver provision allows an employee, with the approval of the
board, to waive his rights to compensation for any injury which is due to
a pre-existing disease. The Massachusetts statute provides:
No agreement by any employee to waive his rights to compensation shall
be valid, but an employee ...who is for any reason peculiarly susceptible to
injury or who is peculiarly likely to become permanently or totally incapacitated by an injury may, at the discretion of the division and with its written
approval within three months after the beginning of his employment, waive
120
his rights to compensation ....
The result achieved by either of these two methods is good for two
reasons. First, employers may be more willing to employ persons with
certain disabilities or diseases where otherwise they might prefer to exclude them. Second, an employer is not liable for the effects of a preexisting disability or disease which he knows nothing about and therefore
cannot guard against.
Apportionment seems the better of these alternative methods, and the
above-quoted Kentucky statute represents an excellent way by which it
can be done. Waiver, on the other hand, has its major shortcomings in
that the prior infirmity must be manifest, the employer must have knowledge thereof and it is only granted upon petition. Any physical examination is costly, and a thorough examination involving "personality factors"
is a complicated and expensive procedure. All employers could not be
expected to have each prospective employee go through a psychiatric examination before hiring, especially in areas and occupations where job
turnover is high. An apportionment provision, therefore, would do automatically what waiver does by involved procedure.
The workmen's compensation laws have eliminated all common law
defenses, but it is neither their function nor their purpose to make the employer an insurer.12' The employer is liable for all injuries received by
the employee which arise out of and in the course of employment. But,
if, after a slight trauma, a neurosis flares up in an employee who was
highly susceptible to psychoneurotic complications or who actually had
a prior neurosis, and only a faint line of causation exists between the
trauma and the resulting condition, it cannot be said that the injury was
the sole cause of the resulting condition. In such a case two factors must
120
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be considered as making up the resulting condition. One arises from the
injury itself, and the other from the pre-existing condition which is independent of the injury. Compensation should be allowed only for the
former. In computing compensation the percentage of the resulting disability due to the pre-existing neurotic constitution or to collateral factors for which compensation should not be allowed would have to be determined. This figure would then be deducted from the compensation
allowed had claimant's condition arisen solely out of the injury, and the
award would be the balance. For example, after an injury claimant was
one hundred per cent disabled for which he would be entitled to a lump
sum settlement of $1,000.122 The prior neurosis is discovered to account
for approximately thirty per cent of the resulting condition. The award
therefore, would be $700 ($1,000 less thirty per cent or $300). Admittedly apportionment would be no easy task, yet it is better than ignoring
the problem entirely.
Rehabilitation too should be considered in any discussion of statutory
changes. Once liability for an injury is established, it should be the duty
of the employer to help the disabled employee either to overcome any
disability or to live within the limits of his disability to the best of his
capabilities.
In cases of neurotic disabilities it is first necessary to help the victim
overcome emotional reactions which may frustrate or delay rehabilitation. Such an emotional reaction may be fostered by the pendency of litigation. A statute should therefore provide for a speedy, lump sum, final
settlement of -the claim. When settlement is slow, collateral complications
are given time to develop, and claimant's feelings of indignation and desire for compensation are kept alive. When settlement is continuously
paid the neurosis is turned into a subconscious gainful occupation and no
real incentive to improve exists. When settlement is not final the claimant expects further compensation will be forthcoming, and the idea of finality to the whole affair is not conveyed. However, this quick settlement
should not be made before a careful examination of the claimant. Once
a proper appraisal of the claimant's illness is made, the settlement should
adequately compensate for all symptoms which can be attributed to the
injury. Care must be taken in cases of traumatic neurosis so that the
claimant is not led to believe that he is being pressured into a quick settlement, for if he believes the compensation to be unjust, resentment over
being cheated and a desire for revenge frustrate rehabilitation.
When the award is made a specific sum should be set aside to be used
solely for rehabilitation. To encourage claimant to take full advantage of
122 This could be received under S 138.9 of the Illinois Act and is advisable in
traumatic neurosis cases.

